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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
GORDON V. STATE: ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE UNDER 
THE ADOPTIVE ADMISSION BY A PARTY -OPPONENT 
HEARSAY EXCEPTION IS A PRELIMINARY 
DETERMINATION FOR THE TRIAL COURT; ADMISSION 
OF DETECTIVE'S TESTIMONY NOT CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
By: Stephanie Lurz 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that whether a declarant 
manifested an adoption or belief in the truth of the statements of another, 
constituting an adoptive admission, was a preliminary question of fact to be 
decided by the trial court. Gordon v. State, 431 Md. 527, 550, 66 AJd 647, 
660 (2013). The court ruled it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to 
permit the arresting detective to testify regarding the defendant's age based 
on the defendant's driver's license under the adoptive admission hearsay 
exception because of his belief in the truth of the information on the license. 
Id. 
On January 14, 2010, Detective Kenneth Klezia questioned Michael 
Gordon ("Gordon") about allegations of inappropriate sexual contact with a 
fourteen-year-old girl, which had recently occurred at a Pacific Sunwear 
store. At Detective Klezia's request, Gordon provided his Florida driver's 
license. He had produced the same license to the detective in an unrelated 
incident on January 9, 2010. Detective Klezia did not recall specifically 
asking Gordon his age. 
In the Circuit Court of Charles County, Gordon was charged with sexual 
solicitation of a minor and third-degree sex offense. To prove a third-degree 
sex offense, the State was required to establish that Gordon was at least 
twenty-one years old when the offense occurred. Detective Klezia testified 
at trial that the license showed Gordon's age to be twenty-seven years old. 
This was the sole evidence of his age produced by the State. Gordon 
objected to this testimony on the grounds that it was hearsay. The State 
argued that the testimony was permissible under Rule 5-803(a)(2), which 
provides a hearsay exception for an adoptive admission by a party-opponent. 
Because Gordon twice provided the license to Detective Klezia, the State 
argued he manifested a belief that the license was a truthful document. The 
trial court overruled Gordon's objection and the jury subsequently found 
Gordon guilty on both counts. 
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Gordon's convictions pursuant to 
Rule 5-803(a)(2). Gordon then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which 
was granted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The court was asked to 
determine whether an individual's use of a driver's license manifested an 
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adoption or belief of the truth of the information contained therein for the 
purposes of the adoptive admission hearsay exception. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed the appropriate 
standard of review, and reviewed the trial court's determination under the 
abuse of discretion standard. Gordon, 431 Md. at 532-33, 66 A.3d at 650 
(citing Hopkins vs. State, 352 Md. 146, 158, 721 A.2d 231, 237 (1998». A 
hearsay exception determination, however, is reviewed de novo. Gordon, 
431 Md. at 533, 66 A.3d at 650 (citing Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8, 887 
A.2d 602, 606 (2005». Neither party contested these points, but they 
nevertheless disagreed on which standard should apply to the instant case. 
Gordon, 431 Md. at 533, 66 A.3d at 650. 
The court stated that there were two components to a ruling on a hearsay 
exception, each with a different standard of review. Gordon, 431 Md. at 
533,66 A.3d at 650. The court clarified that the determination of whether a 
hearsay exception applied wass reviewed de novo, but the findings of fact 
made to reach that conclusion were reviewed under the more deferential 
abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 538, 66 A.3d at 653. The question in 
Gordon, therefore, was whether the trial court made a legal or factual 
determination when it concluded that Gordon made an adoptive admission 
by handing over his driver's license. Id. 
The court noted that most trial court decisions regarding adoptive 
admissions required an examination of facts, including verbal and non-verbal 
conduct. Gordon, 431 Md. at 539-40, 66 A.3d at 654. The court found this 
applied in Gordon, because the facts were not in dispute but the 
circumstances allowed for multiple inferences to be made. Id. at 540, 66 
A.3d at 654-55. Thus, the court reviewed the evidence that the trial court 
used to determine whether or not the adoptive admission hearsay exception 
applied. Id. at 542-550, 66 A.3d at 655-660. 
The evidentiary record showed Gordon was not asked about his age. 
Gordon, 431 Md. at 542-43, 66 A.3d at 656. Rather, he was asked to 
produce identification from which the detective made an inference about his 
age. Id. The court recognized that under Rule 5-803(a)(2), a manifestation 
of an adoption or belief must not be ambiguous. Id. at 544, 66 A.3d at 655-
66. It rejected, however, the argument that Gordon's actions were 
ambiguous because he was not asked about his age. Id. at 545, 66 A.3d at 
658. By giving Detective Klezia the license, he effectively acknowledged 
his age to be twenty-seven years old. Id. at 548, 66 A.3d at 659. He also did 
not dispute the age on the license at the time he showed it to the detective. 
Id. Further, the use of his driver's license involved what the court described 
as a "customary" or "typical exchange," in which one would reasonably 
expect the information provided to be accurate. Id. at 549, 66 A.3d at 660. 
The court concluded that the trial court made a preliminary factual 
finding, thus a "straightforward application of Rule 5-803(a)(2)" was 
required to determine the admissibility of Detective Klezia's testimony. 
Gordon, 431 Md. at 549, 66 A.3d at 660. The court held that the testimony 
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was properly admitted, therefore, it was not an abuse of discrection, and the 
court affirmed the convictions. Id. at 550, 66 A.3d at 660. 
In Gordon, the Court of Appeals clarified its previous holdings on the 
standard of review for hearsay rulings and exceptions. While rulings on the 
admissibility of hearsay must be reviewed de novo, the supporting factual 
findings made by the trial court will be reviewed under the more deferential 
abuse of discretion standard. Because factual findings frequently underpin a 
trial courts decisions on whether to admit evidence based on the hearsay 
exceptions, such decisions will likely be analyzed under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Gordon could demonstrate a precedent allowing the use 
of legal or other identifying documents when used in a customary manner as 
an adoptive admission under the Rule 5-803(a)(2) hearsay exception. 
